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Abstract
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching,
or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms,
where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit
numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the Price
of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic
Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price
of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show
stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.
1 Introduction
One-sided matching (also called the house allocation problem) is the fundamental problem of assigning
items to agents, such that each agent receives exactly one item. It has numerous applications, such as
assigning workers to shifts, students to courses or patients to doctor appointments. In this setting, agents
are often asked to provide ordinal preferences, i.e. preference lists, or rankings of the items. We assume that
underlying these ordinal preferences, agents have numerical values specifying how much they value each item
[18]. In game-theoretic terms, these are the agents’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions [27] and the
associated preferences are often referred to as cardinal preferences.
A mechanism is a function that maps agents’ valuations to matchings. However, agents are rational
strategic entities that might not always report their valuations truthfully; they may misreport their values if
that results in a better matching (from their own perspective). Assuming the agents report their valuations
strategically to maximize their utilities, it is of interest to study the Nash equilibria of the induced game,
i.e. strategy profiles from which no agent wishes to unilaterally deviate.
A natural objective for the designer is to choose the matching that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the
sum of agents’ valuations for the items they are matched with, which is the most prominent measure of
aggregate utility in the literature. Given the strategic nature of the agents, we are interested in mechanisms
that maximize the social welfare in the equilibrium. We use the standard measure of equilibrium inefficiency,
the Price of Anarchy [22], that compares the maximum social welfare attainable in any matching with the
worst-case social welfare that can be achieved in an equilibrium.
We evaluate the efficiency of a mechanism with respect to the Price of Anarchy of the induced game. We
study both deterministic and randomized mechanisms: in the latter case the output is a probability mixture
over matchings, instead of a single matching. We are interested in the class of cardinal mechanisms, which
use cardinal preferences, and generalize the ordinal mechanisms.
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Note that our setting involves no monetary transfers and generally falls under the umbrella of approxi-
mate mechanism design without money [24]. In general settings without money, one has to fix a canonical
representation of the valuations. A common approach in the literature is to consider the unit-sum normal-
ization, i.e. each agent has a total value of 1 for all the items. We obtain results for unit-sum valuations,
and extend most of these to another common normalization, unit-range.
1.1 Our results
In Section 3 we bound the inefficiency of the two best-known mechanisms in the matching literature, Proba-
bilistic Serial and Random Priority. In particular, for n agents and n items, the Price of Anarchy is O(
√
n).
In Section 4 we complement this with a matching lower bound (i.e. Ω(
√
n)) that applies to all cardinal
(randomized) mechanisms. As a result, we conclude that these two ordinal mechanisms (ones that compute
matchings that only depend on preference orderings) are optimal. These results suggest that it does not
help a welfare maximizer to ask agents to report more than the ordinal preferences.
We separately consider deterministic mechanisms and in Section 4 prove that their Price of Anarchy is
Ω(n2), even for cardinal mechanisms. This shows that randomization is necessary for non-trivial worst-case
efficiency guarantees.
In Section 5, we extend our results to more general solutions concepts as well as the case of incomplete
information. Finally, in Section 6, we prove that under a mild “proportionality” property, our lower bound
of Ω(
√
n) extends to the Price of Stability, a more optimistic measure of efficiency [3], which strengthens
the negative results even further. Additionally, we discuss how our results extend to the other common
normalization in the literature, unit-range [2, 15, 28].
1.2 Discussion and related work
The one-sided matching problem was introduced in [18] and has been studied extensively ever since (see [1] for
a recent overview). Over the years, several different mechanisms have been proposed with various desirable
properties related to truthfulness, fairness and economic efficiency with Probabilistic Serial [9, 7, 8, 1] and
Random Priority [1, 9, 4, 23, 15, 2] being the two prominent examples.
As mentioned earlier, in settings without money, one needs to represent the valuations in some canonical
way. A common approach is the unit-sum normalization, i.e. each agent has a total value of 1 for all the
items. Intuitively, this normalization means that each agent has equal influence within the mechanism and
her values can be interpreted as “scrip money” that she uses to acquire items. The unit-sum representation is
standard for social welfare maximization in many settings without money including fair division, cake cutting
and resource allocation [10, 11, 16, 15] among others. Moreover, without any normalization, non-trivial Price
of Anarchy bounds cannot be achieved by any mechanism.
The objective of social welfare maximization for one-sided matching problems has been studied before in
the literature, but mainly for truthful mechanisms [2, 15]. Our lower bounds are more general, since they
apply to all mechanisms, not just truthful ones. In particular, our lower bound on the Price of Anarchy
of all mechanisms generalizes the corresponding bound for truthful mechanisms in [15]. Note that Random
Priority is truthful (truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium) but it has other equilibria as well; we
observe that the welfare guarantees of the mechanism hold for all equilibria, not just the truthtelling ones.
Similar approaches have been made for truthful mechanisms like the second price auction in settings with
money.
While given our general lower bound, proving a matching upper bound for Random Priority is enough
to establish tightness, it is still important to know what the welfare guarantees of Probabilistic Serial are,
given that it is arguably the most popular one-sided matching mechanism. The mechanism was introduced
by [9] and since then, it has been in the center of attention of the matching literature, with related work on
characterizations [17, 20], extensions [19], strategic aspects [21] and hardness of manipulation [6]. Somewhat
surprisingly, the Nash equilibria of the mechanism were only recently studied. Aziz et al. [5] prove that
the mechanism has pure Nash equilibria while Ekici and Kesten [14] study the ordinal equilibria of the
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mechanism and prove that the desirable properties of the mechanism are not necessarily satisfied for those
profiles.
Another, somewhat different recent branch of study considers ordinal measures of efficiency instead
of social welfare maximization, under the assumption that agents’ preferences are only expressed through
preference orderings over items. Bhalgat et al. [8] study the approximation ratio of matching mechanisms,
when the objective is maximization of ordinal social welfare, a notion of efficiency that they define based
solely on ordinal information. Other measures of efficiency for one-sided matchings were also studied in
Krysta et al. [23], where the authors design truthful mechanisms to approximate the size of a maximum
cardinally (or maximum agent weight) Pareto-optimal matching and in Chakrabarty and Swamy [12] where
the authors consider the rank approximation as the measure of efficiency. While interesting, these measures
of efficiency do not accurately encapsulate the socially desired outcome the way that social welfare does,
especially since an underlying cardinal utility structure is part of the setting [9, 18, 27, 28]. Our results
actually suggest that in order to achieve the optimal welfare guarantees, one does not even need to elicit this
utility structure; agents can only be asked to report preference orderings, which is arguably more appealing.
Finally, we point out that our work is in a sense analogous to the literature that studies the Price of
Anarchy in item-bidding auctions (e.g. see [13, 26] and references therein) for settings without money.
Furthermore, the extension of our results to very general solution concepts (coarse correlated equilibria)
and settings of incomplete information (Bayes-Nash equilibria) is somehow reminiscent of the smoothness
framework [25] for games. While our results are not proven using the smoothness condition, our extension
technique is similar in spirit.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents and A = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of indivisible items. An
allocation is a matching of agents to items, that is, an assignment of items to agents where each agent gets
assigned exactly one item. We can view an allocation µ as a permutation vector (µ1, µ2 . . . , µn) where µi
is the unique item matched with agent i. Let O be the set of all allocations. Each agent i has a valuation
function ui : A → R mapping items to real numbers. Valuation functions are considered to be well-defined
modulo positive affine transformations, that is, for item j : j → αui(j)+β is considered to be an alternative
representation of the same valuation function ui. Given this, we fix the canonical representation of ui to be
unit-sum, that is
∑
j ui(j) = 1, with ui(j) ≥ 0 for all i, j. Equivalently, we can consider valuation functions
as valuation vectors ui = (ui1, ui2, . . . , uin) and let V be the set of all valuation vectors of an agent. Let
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) denote a typical valuation profile and let V
n be the set of all valuation profiles with n
agents.
We consider strategic agents who might have incentives to misreport their valuations. We define s =
(s1, s2, . . . , sn) to be a pure strategy profile, where si is the reported valuation vector of agent i. We will use
s−i to denote the strategy profile without the ith coordinate and hence s = (si, s−i) is an alternative way to
denote a strategy profile. A direct revelation mechanism without money is a function M : V n → O mapping
reported valuation profiles to matchings. For a randomized mechanism, we define M to be a random map
M : V n → O. LetMi(s) denote the restriction of the outcome of the mechanism to the i’th coordinate, which
is the item assigned to agent i by the mechanism. For randomized mechanisms, we let pM,sij = Pr[Mi(s) = j]
and pM,si = (p
M,s
i1 , . . . , p
M,s
in ). When it is clear from the context, we drop one or both of the superscripts from
the terms pM,sij . The utility of an agent from the outcome of a deterministic mechanismM on input strategy
profile s is simply ui(Mi(s)). For randomized mechanisms, an agent’s utility is E[ui(Mi(s))] =
∑n
j=1 p
M,s
ij uij .
A subclass of mechanisms that are of particular interest is that of ordinal mechanisms. Informally,
ordinal mechanisms operate solely based on the ordering of items induced by the valuation functions and
not the actual numerical values themselves, while cardinal mechanisms take those numerical values into
account. Formally, a mechanism M is ordinal if for any strategy profiles s, s′ such that for all agents i and
for all items j, ℓ, sij < siℓ ⇔ s′ij < s′iℓ, it holds that M(s) = M(s′). A mechanism for which the above
does not necessarily hold is cardinal. Equivalently, the strategy space of ordinal mechanisms is the set of
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all permutations of n items instead of the space of valuation functions V n. A strategy si of agent i is a
preference ordering of items (a1, a2, . . . , an) where aℓ ≻ ak for ℓ < k. We will write j ≻i j′ to denote that
agent i prefers item j to item j′ according to her true valuation function and j ≻si j′ to denote that she
prefers item j to item j′ according to her strategy si. When it is clear from the context, we abuse the
notation slightly and let ui denote the truthtelling strategy of agent i, even when the mechanism is ordinal.
Note that agents can be indifferent between items and hence the preference order can be a weak ordering.
Two properties of interest are anonymity and neutrality. A mechanism is anonymous if the output is
invariant under renamings of the agents and neutral if the output is invariant under relabeling of the objects.
An equilibrium is a strategy profile in which no agent has an incentive to deviate to a different strategy.
First, we will focus on the concept of pure Nash equilibrium, formally
Definition 1 A strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium if ui(Mi(s)) ≥ ui(Mi(s′i, s−i)) for all agents i,
and pure deviating strategies s′i.
In Section 5, we extend our results to more general equilibrium notions as well as the setting of incomplete
information, where agents’ values are drawn from known distributions. Let SMu denote the set of all pure
Nash equilibria of mechanism M under truthful valuation profile u. The measure of efficiency that we will
use is the pure Price of Anarchy,
PoA(M) = sup
u∈V n
SWOPT (u)
mins∈SM
u
SWM (u, s)
where SWM (u, s) =
∑n
i=1 E[ui(Mi(s))] is the expected social welfare of mechanism M on strategy profile s
under true valuation profile u, and SWOPT (u) = maxµ∈O
∑n
i=1 ui(µi) is the social welfare of the optimal
matching. Let OPT (u) be the optimal matching on profile u and let OPTi(u) be the restriction to the ith
coordinate.
3 Price of Anarchy guarantees
In this section, we prove the (pure) Price of Anarchy guarantees of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority.
Together with our lower bound in the next section, the results establish that both mechanisms are optimal
among all mechanisms for the problem.
First we consider Random Priority, often referred to as Random Serial Dictatorship. The mechanism
first fixes an ordering of the agents uniformly at random and then according to that ordering, it sequentially
matches them with their most preferred item that is still available. Filos-Ratsikas et al. [15] proved that
the welfare in any truthtelling equilibrium is an Ω(1/
√
n)-fraction of the maximum social welfare. While
Random Priority has other equilibria as well, to establish the Price of Anarchy bound, it suffices to observe
that at least for distinct valuations, any strategy other than truthtelling does not affect the allocation and
hence it does not affect the social welfare. Intuitively, since agents pick their most preferred items, any
equilibrium strategy would place the most preferred available items on top of the preference list, while the
ordering of the items that are not picked does not affect the allocation of other agents. For valuations that
are not distinct, the argument can be adapted using small perturbations of the values, losing only a small
fraction of welfare. We state the theorem; the details are left for the full version.
Theorem 1 The Price of Anarchy of Random Priority is O(
√
n).
We next consider Probabilistic Serial, which we abbreviate to PS. Informally, the mechanism is the following.
Each item can be viewed as an infinitely divisible good that all agents can consume at unit speed during
the unit time interval [0, 1]. Initially each agent consumes her most preferred item (or one of her most
preferred items in case of ties) until the item is entirely consumed. Then, the agent moves on to consume the
item on top of her preference list, among items that have not yet been entirely consumed. The mechanism
terminates when all items have been entirely consumed. The fraction pij of item j consumed by agent i is
then interpreted as the probability that agent i will be matched with item j under the mechanism.
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We prove that the Price of Anarchy of PS is O(
√
n). Aziz et al. [5] proved that PS has pure Nash
equilibria, so it makes sense to consider the pure Price of Anarchy; we will extend the result to the coarse
correlated Price of Anarchy and the Bayesian Price of Anarchy in Section 5.
We start with the following two lemmas, which prove that in a pure Nash equilibrium of the mechanism
an agent’s utility cannot be much worse than what her utility would be if she were consuming the item she
is matched with in the optimal allocation from the beginning of the mechanism until the item is entirely
consumed. Let tj(s) be the time when item j is entirely consumed on profile s under PS(s).
Lemma 1 Let s be any strategy profile and let s∗i be any strategy such that j ≻s∗i ℓ for all items ℓ 6= j, i.e.
agent i places item j on top of her preference list. Then it holds that tj(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ 14 · tj(s).
Proof: For ease of notation, let s∗ = (s∗i , s−i). Obviously, if j ≻si ℓ for all ℓ 6= j and since all other agents’
reports are fixed, tj(s
∗) = tj(s) and the statement of the lemma holds. Hence, we will assume that there
exists some item j′ 6= j such that j′ ≻si j.
First, note that if agent i is the only one consuming item j for the duration of the mechanism, then
tj(s
∗) = 1 and we are done. Hence, assume that at least one other agent consumes item j at some point, and
let τ be the time when the first agent besides agent i starts consuming item j in s∗. Obviously, tj(s∗) > τ ,
therefore if τ ≥ 14 · tj(s) then tj(s∗) ≥ 14 · tj(s) and we are done. So assume that τ < 14 · tj(s). Next observe
that in the interval [τ, tj(s
∗)], agent i can consume at most half of what remains of item i because there
exists at least one other agent consuming the item for the same duration. Overall, agent i’s consumption is
at most 12 +
1
4 tj(s) so at least
1
2 − 14 tj(s) of the item will be consumed by the rest of the agents.
Now consider all agents other than i in profile s and let α be the the amount of item j that they have
consumed by time tj(s). Notice that the total consumption speed of an item is non-decreasing in time which
means in particular that for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, agents other than i need at least βtj(s) time to consume α · β
in profile s. Next, notice that since agent i starts consuming item j at time 0 in s∗ and all other agents use
the same strategies in s and s∗, it holds that every agent k 6= i starts consuming item j in s∗ no sooner than
she does in s. This means that in profile s∗, agents other than i will need more time to consume β · α; in
particular they will need at least βtj(s) time, so tj(s
∗) ≥ βtj(s). However, from the previous paragraph we
know that they will consume at least 12 − 14 tj(s), so letting β = 1α
(
1
2 − 14 tj(s)
)
we get
tj(s
∗) ≥ βtj(s) ≥ tj(s)
(
1
2
− 1
4
· tj(s)
)
1
α
≥ tj(s)
(
1
2
− 1
4
· tj(s)
)
≥ 1
4
· tj(s)
 Now we can lower bound the utility of an agent at any pure Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Let u be the profile of true agent valuations and let s be a pure Nash equilibrium. For any agent
i and any item j it holds that the utility of agent i at s is at least 14 · tj(s) · uij.
Proof: Let s′ = (s′i, s−i) be the strategy profile obtained from s when agent i deviates to the strategy
s′i where s
′
i is some strategy such that j ≻s′i ℓ for all items ℓ 6= j. Since s is a pure Nash equilibrium, it
holds that ui(PSi(s)) ≥ ui(PSi(s′)) ≥ tj(s′) · uij , where the last inequality holds since the utility of agent
i is at least as much as the utility she obtains from the consumption of item j. By Lemma 1, it holds that
tj(s
′) ≥ 14 · tj(s) and hence ui(PSi(s)) ≥ 14 · tj(s) · uij .  We can now prove the pure Price of Anarchy
guarantee of the mechanism.
Theorem 2 The pure Price of Anarchy of Probabilistic Serial is O(
√
n).
5
Proof: Let u be any profile of true agents’ valuations and let s be any pure Nash equilibrium. First, note
that by reporting truthfully, every agent i can get an allocation that is at least as good as (1/n, . . . , 1/n),
regardless of other agents’ strategies. To see this, first consider time t = 1/n and observe that during the
interval [0, 1/n], agent i is consuming her favorite item (say a1) and hence pia1 ≥ 1/n. Next, consider
time τ = 2/n and observe that during the interval [0, 2/n], agent i is consuming one or both of her two
favorite items (a1 and a2) and hence pia1 + pia2 ≥ 2/n. By a similar argument, for any k, it holds that∑n
j=1 piaj ≥ k/n. This implies that regardless of other agents’ strategies, agent i can achieve a utility of
at least 1n
∑n
j=1 uij . Since s is a pure Nash equilibrium, it holds that ui(PSi(s)) ≥ (1/n)
∑n
j=1 uij as well.
Summing over all agents, we get that SWPS(u, s) ≥ (1/n)
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 uij = 1. If SWOPT (u) ≤
√
n then we
are done, so assume SWOPT (u) >
√
n.
Because PS is neutral we can assume tj(s) ≤ tj′ (s) for j < j′ without loss of generality. Observe that
for all j = 1, . . . , n, it holds that tj(s) ≥ j/n. This is true because for any t ∈ [0, 1], by time t, exactly tn
mass of items must have been consumed by the agents. Since j is the jth item that is entirely consumed, by
time tj(s), the mass of items that must have been consumed is at least j. By this, we get that tj(s) · n ≥ j,
which implies tj(s) ≥ j/n.
For each j let ij be the agent that gets item j in the optimal allocation and for ease of notation, let wij
be her valuation for the item. Now by Lemma 2, it holds that
uij (PS(s)) ≥
1
4
j
n
wij and SWPS(u, s) ≥
1
4
n∑
j=1
j
n
wij .
The Price of Anarchy is then at most
4
∑n
j=1 wij∑n
j=1 j · wij /n
.
Consider the case when the above ratio is maximized and let k be an integer such that k ≤∑nj=1 wij ≤ k+1.
Then it must be that wij = 1 for j = 1, . . . , k and wij = 0, for k + 2 ≤ ij ≤ n. Hence the maximum ratio is
(k + wik+1 )/(awik+1 + b), for some a, b > 0, which is monotone for wik+1 in [0, 1]. Therefore, the maximum
value of (k+wik+1 )/(awik+1 + b) is achieved when either wik+1 = 0 or wik+1 = 1. As a result, the maximum
value of the ratio is obtained when
∑
i=1n wik+1 = k for some k. By simple calculations, the Price of Anarchy
should be at most:
4k∑k
j=1
j
n
≤ 4k
k(k−1)
2n
=
8n
k − 1 ,
so the Price of Anarchy is maximized when k is minimized. By the argument earlier, k >
√
n and hence the
ratio is O(
√
n).  In Section 5, we extend Theorem 2 to broader solution concepts and the incomplete
information setting.
4 Lower bounds
In this section, we prove our main lower bound. Note that the result holds for any mechanism, including
randomized and cardinal mechanisms. Since we are interested in mechanisms with good properties, it is
natural to consider those mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3 The pure Price of Anarchy of any mechanism is Ω(
√
n).
Proof: Assume n = k2 for some k ∈ N. LetM be a mechanism and consider the following valuation profile
u. There are
√
n sets of agents and let Gj denote the j-th set. For every j ∈ {1, . . . ,
√
n} and every agent
i ∈ Gj , it holds that uij = 1/n + α and uik = 1/n − α/(n − 1), for k 6= j, where α is sufficiently small.
Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium and for every set Gj , let ij = argmini∈Gj p
M,s
ij (break ties arbitrarily).
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Observe that for all j = 1, . . . ,
√
n, it holds that pM,sijj ≤ 1/
√
n and let I = {i1, i2, . . . , i√n}. Now consider
the valuation profile u′ where:
• For every agent i /∈ I, u′i = ui.
• For every agent ij ∈ I, let u′ijj = 1 and u′ijk = 0 for all k 6= j.
We claim that s is a pure Nash equilibrium under u′ as well. For agents not in I, the valuations have not
changed and hence they have no incentive to deviate. Assume now for contradiction that some agent i ∈ I
whose most preferred item is item j could deviate to some beneficial strategy s′i. Since agent i only values
item j, this would imply that p
M,(s′i,s−i)
ij > p
M,s
ij . However, since agent i values all items other than j equally
under ui and her most preferred item is item j, such a deviation would also be beneficial under profile u,
contradicting the fact that s is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the expected social welfare of M under valuation profile u′ at the pure Nash equilibrium
s. For agents not in I and taking α to be less than 1/n3, the contribution to the social welfare is at most 1.
For agents in I, the contribution to the welfare is then at most (1/
√
n)
√
n+1 and hence the expected social
welfare of M is at most 3. As the optimal social welfare is at least
√
n, the bound follows.  Interestingly,
if we restrict our attention to deterministic mechanisms, then we can prove that only trivial pure Price of
Anarchy guarantees are achievable.
Theorem 4 The pure Price of Anarchy of any deterministic mechanism is Ω(n2).
Proof: LetM be a deterministic mechanism that always has a pure Nash equilibrium. Let u be a valuation
profile such that for for all agents i and i′, it holds that ui = ui′ , ui1 = 1/n+ 1/n3 and uij > uik for j < k.
Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium for this profile and assume without loss of generality that Mi(s) = i.
Now fix another true valuation profile u′ such that u′1 = u1 and for agents i = 2, . . . , n, u
′
i,i−1 = 1− ǫ′i,i−1
and uij = ǫ
′
ij for j 6= i− 1, where 0 ≤ ǫ′ij ≤ 1/n3,
∑
j 6=i−1 ǫ
′
ij = ǫ
′
i,i−1 and ǫ
′
ij > ǫ
′
ik if j < k when j, k 6= i− 1.
Intuitively, in profile u′, each agent i ∈ {2, . . . , n} has valuation close to 1 for item i− 1 and small valuations
for all other items. Futhermore, she prefers items with smaller indices, except for item i− 1.
We claim that s is a pure Nash equilibrium under true valuation profile u as well. Assume for contradiction
that some agent i has a benefiting deviation, which matches her with an item that she prefers more than
i. But then, since the set of items that she prefers more than i in both u and u′ is {1, . . . , i}, the same
deviation would match her with a more preferred item under u as well, contradicting the fact that s is a
pure Nash equilibrium. It holds that SWOPT (u
′) ≥ n − 2 whereas the social welfare of M is at most 2/n
and the theorem follows.  The mechanism that naively maximizes the sum of the reported valuations
with no regard to incentives, when equipped with a lexicographic tie-breaking rule has pure Nash equilibria
and also achieves the above ratio in the worst-case, which means that the bounds are tight.
5 General solution concepts
In the previous sections, we employed the pure Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for bounding the
inefficiency of mechanisms, mainly because of its simplicity. Here, we describe how to extend our results
to broader well-known equilibrium concepts in the literature. Due to lack of space, we will only discuss
the two most general solution concepts, the coarse correlated equilibrium for complete information and the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium for incomplete information. Since other concepts (like the mixed-Nash equilibrium
for instance) are special cases of those two, it suffices to use those for our extensions.
Definition 2 Given a mechanism M , let q be a distribution over strategies. Also, for any distribution ∆
let ∆−i denote the marginal distribution without the ith index. Then a strategy profile q is called a
1. coarse correlated equilibrium if
E
s∼q[ui(Mi(s))] ≥ Es∼q[ui(Mi((s
′
i, s−i)))],
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2. Bayes-Nash equilibrium for a distribution ∆u where each (∆u)i is independent, if when u ∼ ∆u then
q(u) = ×iqi(ui) and for all ui in the support of (∆u)i,
E
u
−i,s∼q(u)
[ui(Mi(s))] ≥ E
u
−i,s−i∼q−i(u−i)
[ui(Mi(s
′
i, s−i))]
where the given inequalities hold for all agents i, and (pure) deviating strategies s′i. Also notice that for
randomized mechanisms definitions are with respect to an expectation over the random choices of the mech-
anism.
The coarse correlated and the Bayesian Price of Anarchy are defined similarly to the pure Price of Anarchy.
Again, first we mention that we can obtain the extensions to Random Priority rather straightforwardly,
based on the fact that even when using probability mixtures over strategies, an agent will always (in every
realization) pick her most preferred item among the set of available items when she is chosen. In other words,
any pure strategy in the support of the distribution will rank the most preferred available item first, and the
ordering of the remaining items does not affect the distribution. Since the arguments are not very involved,
we leave the details for the full version.
Theorem 5 The coarse correlated Price of Anarchy of Random Priority is O(
√
n). The Bayesian Price of
Anarchy of Random Priority is O(
√
n).
Next, we turn to Probabilistic Serial and prove the Price of Anarchy guarantees, with respect to coarse
correlated equilibria and Bayes-Nash equilibria. Before we state our theorems however, we will briefly
discuss the connection of those extensions with the smoothness framework of Roughgarden [25]. According
to the definition in [25], a game is (λ, µ)-smooth if it satisfies the following condition
n∑
i=1
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ λSW (s∗)− µSW (s), (1)
where s∗ is a pure strategy profile that corresponds to the optimal allocation and s is any pure strategy
profile. It is not hard to see that a (λ, µ)-smooth game has a Price of Anarchy bounded by (µ+ 1)/λ.
Since establishing that a game is smooth also implies a pure Price of Anarchy bound, an alternative
way of attempting to prove Theorem 2 would be to try to show smoothness of the game induced by PS, for
µ/λ =
√
n. However, this seems to be a harder task than what we actually do, since in such a proof, one
would have to argue about the utilities of agents and possibly reason about the relative preferences for other
items, other than the item they are matched with in the optimal allocation. Our approach only needs to
consider those items, and hence it seems to be simpler.
An added benefit to the smoothness framework is the existence of the extension theorem in [25], which
states that for a (λ, µ)-smooth game, the Price of Anarchy guarantee extends to broader solution concepts
verbatim, without any extra work. At first glance, one might think that proving smoothness for the game
induced by PS might be worth the extra effort, since we would get the extensions “for free”. A closer look at
our proofs however shows that our approach is very similar to the proof of the extension theorem but using
an alternative, simpler condition.
Specifically, the analysis in [25] uses Inequality 1 as a building block and substitutes the inequality into
the expectations that naturally appear when considering randomized strategies. This can be done because
the condition applies to all strategy profiles s, when s∗ is an optimal strategy profile. This is exactly what
we do as well, but we use the inequality tj(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ 14 · tj(s) instead, which is simpler but sufficient since
it only applies to the game at hand. If OPTi(u) = j, which is what we use in the proof of Theorem 2, then
(s∗i , s−i) can be thought of as a profile where an agent deviates to her strategy in the optimal profile and
hence the left-hand side of the inequality is analogous to the left-hand side of Inequality 1. In a sense, the
inequality tj(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ 14 · tj(s), can be viewed as a “smoothness equivalent” for the game induced by PS,
which then allows us to extend the results to broader solution concepts.
First, we extend Theorem 2 to the case where the solution concept is the coarse correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 6 The coarse correlated Price of Anarchy of Probabilistic Serial is O(
√
n).
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Proof: Let u be any valuation profile and let i be any agent. Furthermore, let j = OPTi(u) and let s
′
i
be the pure strategy that places item j on top of agent i’s preference list. By Lemma 1, the inequality
tj(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ 14 tj(s) holds for every strategy profile s. In particular, it holds for any pure strategy profile s
where si is in the support of the distribution of the mixed strategy qi of agent i, for any coarse correlated
equilibrium q.This implies that
E
s∼q
[ui(PSi(s))] ≥ E
s∼q
[ui(PSi(s
′
i, s−i))]
≥ E
s∼q
[uijtj(s
′
i, s−i))] ≥
1
4
uijtj(s).
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 1. Using this, we can use very similar arguments to the arguments
of the proof of Theorem 2 and obtain the bound.  For the incomplete information setting, when
valuations are drawn from some publically known distributions, we can prove the same upper bound on the
Bayesian Price of Anarchy of the mechanism.
Theorem 7 The Bayesian Price of Anarchy of Probabilistic Serial is O(
√
n).
Proof: The proof is again similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Let u be a valuation profile drawn from some
distribution satisfying the unit-sum constraint. Let i be any agent and let ju = OPTi(u), i ∈ [n]. Note that
by a similar argument as the one used in the proof of Theorem 2, the expected social welfare of PS is at least
1 and hence we can assume that Eu[SWOPT (u)] ≥ 2
√
2n+ 1. Observe that in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium
q(u) it holds that
E
u
s∼q(u)
[ui(s)] = E
ui

 E
u−i
s∼q(u)
[ui(s)]


≥ E
ui

 E
u−i
s−i∼q−i(u−i)
[ui(s
′
i, s−i)]


≥ E
ui

 E
u−i
s−i∼q−i(u−i)
[uijutju(s
′
i, s−i)]


≥ E
ui

 E
u−i
s∼q(u)
[
1
4
uijutju(s)
]

=
1
4
E
u
s∼q(u)
[uijutju(s)]
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 1 since s′i denotes the strategy that puts item ju on top of
agent i’s preference list. Note that this can be a different strategy for every different u that we sample.
For notational convenience, we use s′i to denote every such strategy. The expected social welfare at the
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium is then at least
n∑
i=1
E
u,s∼q(u)
[ui(s)] ≥ 1
4
∑
i∈[n]
E
u
s∼q(u)
[uiju tju(s)]
≥ E
u
s∼q(u)

∑
i∈[n]
i
4n
uiju


≥ E
u
s∼q(u)
[
SWOPT (u)(SWOPT (u)− 1)
8n
]
= E
u
[
SWOPT (u)(SWOPT (u)− 1)
8n
]
≥ Eu
[
(SWOPT (u))
2
]− Eu [SWOPT (u)]
8n
≥ Eu[SWOPT (u)]
2
√
2n
,
and the bound follows. 
6 Extensions
6.1 Price of Stability
Theorem 3 bounds the Price of Anarchy of all mechanisms. A more optimistic (and hence stronger when
proving lower bounds) measure of efficiency is the Price of Stability, i.e. the worst-case ratio over all valuation
profiles of the optimal social welfare over the welfare attained at the best equilibrium. We extend Theorem
3 to the Price of Stability of all mechanisms that satisfy a “proportionality” property.
Let a1 ≻i a2 ≻i · · · ≻i an be the (possibly weak) preference ordering of agent i. A random assignment
vector pi for agent i stochastically dominates another random assignment vector qi if
∑k
j=1 piaj ≥
∑k
j=1 qiaj ,
for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n. The notation that we will use for this relation is pi ≻sdi qi.
Definition 3 (Safe strategy) Let M be a mechanism. A strategy si is a safe strategy if for any strategy
profile s−i of the other players, it holds that Mi(si, s−i) ≻sdi
(
1
n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n
)
.
We will say that a mechanism M has a safe strategy if every agent i has a safe strategy si in M . We now
state our lower bound.
Theorem 8 The pure Price of Stability of any mechanism that has a safe strategy is Ω(
√
n).
Proof: Let M be a mechanism and let I = {k + 1, . . . , n} be a subset of agents. Let u be the following
valuation profile.
• For all agents i ∈ I, let uij = 1k for j = 1, · · · , k and uij = 0 otherwise.
• For all agents i /∈ I, let uii = 1 and uij = 0, j 6= i.
Now let s be a pure Nash equilibrium on profile u and let s′i be a safe strategy of agent i. The expected
utility of each agent i ∈ I in the pure Nash equilibrium s is
E[ui(s)] =
∑
j∈[n]
pij(si, s−i)vij ≥
∑
j∈[n]
pij(s
′
i, s−i)vij
≥ 1
n
∑
j∈[n]
vij =
1
n
,
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due to the fact that s is pure Nash equilibrium and s′i is a safe strategy of agent i. On the other hand, the
utility of agent i ∈ I can be calculated by E[ui(s)] =
∑
j∈[n] pij(si, s−i)vij = (
∑k
j=1 pij)/k. Because s is a
pure Nash equilibrium, it holds that E[ui] ≥ 1/n, so we get that
∑k
j=1 pij ≥ k/n for all i ∈ I. As for the
rest of the agents, ∑
i∈N\I
k∑
j=1
pij = k −
∑
i∈I
k∑
j=1
pij ≤ k − (n− k)k
n
=
k2
n
.
This implies that the contribution to the social welfare from agents not in I is at most k2/n and the expected
social welfare of M will be at most 1 + (k2/n). It holds that SWOPT (u) ≥ k and the bound follows by
letting k =
√
n.  Due to Theorem 8, in order to obtain an Ω(
√
n) bound for a mechanism M , it suffices
to prove that M has a safe strategy. In fact, most reasonable mechanisms, including Random Priority and
Probabilistic Serial, as well as all ordinal envy-free mechanisms satisfy this property.
Definition 4 (Envy-freeness) A mechanism M is (ex-ante) envy-free if for all agents i and r and all
profiles s, it holds that
∑n
j=1 pijsij ≥
∑n
j=1 prjsrj. Furthermore, if M is ordinal, then this implies p
M,s
i ≻sdsi
pM,sr .
Given the interpretation of a truth-telling safe strategy as a “proportionality” property, the next lemma is
not surprising.
Lemma 3 Let M be an ordinal, envy-free mechanism. Then for any agent i, the truth-telling strategy ui is
a safe strategy.
Proof: Let s = (ui, s−i) be the strategy profile in which agent i is truth-telling and the rest of the agents
are playing some strategies s−i. Since M is envy-free and ordinal, it holds that
∑ℓ
j=1 p
s
ij ≥
∑ℓ
j=1 p
s
rj for
all agents r ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Summing up these inequalities for agents r = 1, 2, . . . , n we
obtain
n
ℓ∑
j=1
psij ≥
ℓ∑
j=1
n∑
r=1
psrj = ℓ,
which implies that
∑ℓ
j=1 p
s
ij ≥ ℓn , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}.  Note that
since Probabilistic Serial is ordinal and envy-free [9], by Lemma 3, it has a safe strategy and hence Theorem
8 applies. It is not hard to see that Random Priority has a safe strategy too.
Lemma 4 Random Priority has a safe strategy.
Proof: Since Random Priority first fixes an ordering of agents uniformly at random, every agent i has a
probability of 1/n to be selected first to choose an item, a probability of 2/n to be selected first or second
and so on. If the agent ranks her items truthfully, then for every ℓ = 1, . . . , n, it holds that
∑ℓ
i=1 pij ≥ ℓ/n.
 In a sense, the safe strategy property is essential for the bound to hold; one can show that the randomly
dictatorial mechanism, that matches a uniformly chosen agent with her most preferred item and the rest
of the agents with items based solely on that agent’s reports achieves a constant Price of Stability. On the
other hand, the Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is Ω(n). It would be interesting to show whether Price
of Anarchy guarantees imply Price of Stability lower bounds in general.
6.2 Unit-range representation
Our second extension is concerned with the other normalization that is also common in the literature [28,
2, 15], the unit-range representation, that is, maxj ui(j) = 1 and minj ui(j) = 0. First, the Price of Anarchy
guarantees from Section 3 extend directly to the unit-range case. For Random Priority, since the results
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in [15] hold for this normalization as well, we can apply the same techniques to prove the bounds. For
Probabilistic Serial, first, observe that Lemma 2 holds independently of the representation. Secondly, in the
proof of Theorem 2, it now holds that
SWPS(u, s) ≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
uij ≥ 1,
which is sufficient for bounding the Price of Anarchy when SWOPT (u) ≤
√
n. Finally, the arguments for
the case when SWOPT (u) ≤
√
n hold for both representations.
Concerning the lower bounds, we can prove the following theorem on the Price of Anarchy of deterministic
mechanisms.
Theorem 9 The Price of Anarchy of any deterministic mechanism that always has pure Nash equilibria is
Ω(n) for the unit-range representation.
Again, similarly to the corresponding bound in Section 4, the mechanism that naively maximizes the sum
of the reported valuations has pure Nash equilibria and achieves the above bound. The proof of Theorem 9
is quite similar to that of Theorem 4 and is omitted due to lack of space.
More importantly, it is not clear whether the general lower bound on the Price of Anarchy of all mecha-
nisms that we proved in Theorem 3 extends to the unit-range representation as well. In fact, we do not know
of any bound for the unit-range case and proving one seems to be a quite complicated task. As a first step
in that direction, the following theorem obtains a lower bound for ǫ-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria. A
strategy profile is an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if no agent can deviate to another strategy and
improve her utility by more than ǫ. While the following result applies for any positive ǫ, it is weaker than a
corresponding result for exact equilibria.
Theorem 10 Let M be a mechanism and let ǫ ∈ (0, 1). The ǫ−approximate Price of Anarchy of M is
Ω(n1/4) for the unit-range representation.
Proof: Assume n = k2, where k ∈ N will be the size of a subset I of “important” agents. We consider
valuation profiles where, for some parameter δ ∈ (0, 1),
• all agents have value 1 for item 1,
• there is a subset I of agents with |I| = k for which any agent i ∈ I has value δ2 for any item
j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and 0 for all other items,
• for agent i 6∈ I, i has value δ3 for items j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and 0 for all other items.
Let u be such a valuation profile and let s be a Nash equilibrium. In the optimal allocation members of I
receive items {2, . . . , k + 1} and such an allocation has social welfare kδ2 + 1.
First, we claim that there are k(1 − 2δ) members of I whose payoffs in s are at most δ; call this set X .
If that were false, then there would be more than 2kδ members of I whose payoffs in s were more than δ.
That would imply that the social welfare of s was more than 2kδ2, which would contradict the optimal social
welfare attainable, for large enough n (specifically, n > 1/δ4).
Next, we claim that there are at least k(1− 2δ) non-members of I whose probability (in s) to receive any
item in {1, . . . , k + 1} is at most 4(k + 1)/n; call this set Y . To see this, observe that there are at least 34n
agents who all have probability ≤ 4/n to receive item 1. Furthermore, there are at least 3n/4 agents who
all have probability ≤ 4k/n to receive an item from the set 2, . . . , k+ 1. Hence there are at least n/2 agents
whose probabilities to obtain these items satisfy both properties.
We now consider the operation of swapping the valuations of the agents in sets X and Y so that the
members of I from X become non-members, and vice versa. We will argue that given that they were best-
responding beforehand, they are δ-best-responding afterwards. Consequently s is an δ-NE of the modified
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set of agents. The optimum social welfare is unchanged by this operation since it only involves exchanging
the payoff functions of pairs of agents. We show that the social welfare of s is some fraction of the optimal
social welfare, that goes to 0 as n increases and δ decreases.
Let I ′ be the set of agents who, after the swap, have the higher utility of δ2 for getting items from
{2, . . . , k + 1}. That is, I ′ is the set of agents in Y , together with I minus the agents in X .
Following the above valuation swap, the agents in X are δ-best responding. To see this, note that these
agents have had a reduction to their utilities for the outcome of receiving items from {2, . . . , k + 1}. This
means that a profitable deviation for such agents should result in them being more likely to obtain item 1, in
return for them being less likely to obtain an item from {2, . . . , k+1}. However they cannot have probability
more than δ to receive item 1, since that would contradict the property that their expected payoff was at
most δ.
After the swap, the agents in Y are also δ-best responding. Again, these agents have had their utilities
increased from δ3 to δ2 for the outcome of receiving an item from {2, . . . , k + 1}. Hence any profitable
deviation for such an agent would involve a reduction in the probability to get item 1 in return for an
increased probability to get an item from {2, . . . , k + 1}. However, since the payoff for any item from
{2, . . . , k + 1} is only δ2, such a deviation pays less than δ.
Finally, observe that the social welfare of s under the new profile (after the swap) is at most 1+3kδ3. To
see this, note that (by an earlier argument and the definition of I ′) k(1− 2δ) members of I ′ have probability
at most 4(k + 1)/n to receive any item from {1, . . . , k + 1}. To upper bound the expected social welfare,
note that item 1 contributes 1 to the social welfare. Items in {2, . . . , k+ 1} contribute in total, δ2 times the
expected number of members of I ′ who get them, plus δ3 times the expected number of non-members of I ′
who get them, which is at most δ2k2δ + δ3k(1− 2δ) which is less than 3kδ3.
Overall, the price of anarchy is at least (kδ2 + 1)/3kδ3, which is more than 1/δ. The statement of the
theorem is obtained by choosing δ to be less than ǫ, n large enough for the arguments to hold for the chosen
δ, i.e. n > 1/δ4. 
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Our results are rather negative: we identify a non-constant lower bound on the Price of Anarchy for one-sided
matching, and find a matching upper bound achieved by well-known ordinal mechanisms. However, such
negative results are important to understand the challenge faced by a social-welfare maximizer: for example,
we establish that it is not enough to elicit cardinal valuations, in order to obtain good social welfare. It
may be that better welfare guarantees should use some assumption of truth-bias, or some assumption of
additional structure in agents’ preferences.
An interesting direction of research would be to identify conditions on the valuation space that allow for
constant values of the Price of Anarchy or impose some distributional assumption on the inputs and quantify
the average loss in welfare due to selfish behavior. For the general, worst-case setting, one question raised is
whether one can obtain Price of Anarchy or Price of Stability bounds that match our upper bounds for the
unit-range representation as well.
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